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Introduction
Economists, sociologists, and political scientists have convincingly shown that trust, namely the beliefs in others'reliability, a¤ects growth, stability, and the business cycle 1 as it facilitates economic transactions 2 , particularly …nancial ones 3 , and improves the functioning of institutions 4 . So far, the focus of the literature has been primarily on trust among agents involved in economic transactions or citizens served by institutions. Little has been written upon trust in large institutions, such as policy makers 5 , notwithstanding that it surely a¤ects the transmission of macro and policy shocks.
The e¢ cacy of monetary policy in particular depends upon the ability to a¤ect future expectations 6 , with the latter being linked to trust.
While credibility and the degree of commitment are intrinsic features of the policy making institutional design, trust pertains to agents' beliefs of the policy maker reliability as resulting from their mutual interaction and for a given degree of institutional commitment. Trust contains both a behavioral and a social component. The behavioral trust is the ex ante belief that agents place upon policy makers'reliability. The social component results from the equilibrium interaction of betrayal averse agents and randomly opportunistic policy makers. The equilibrium level of trust will ultimately a¤ect agents' risk aversion, marginal utility, and stochastic discount factors. In a trust game a lower gain from a trusting behavior increases the risk dominance of the non-cooperative equilibrium and reduces the marginal degree of betrayal aversion in the population (or reduces the average level of trust). In turn, the endogenous decrease in the equilibrium level of trust increases absolute and relative risk aversion, as measured by a trust-adjusted Arrow-Pratt metric. Notice that while trust is not priced per se, it does eventually a¤ect the shadow price that agents attach to risky outcomes, namely agents'stochastic discount factors. This is the sense in which it induces positive collective externalities. The endogenous nature makes trust a time-varying variable both in the long run and along the business cycle. Its business cycle ‡uctuations will eventually account for the mutual feedback with policy actions. 1 See Knack and Keefer [14] , Alesina and La Ferrara [3] , Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer [1] . 2 See Arrow [4] . 3 See Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales [12] . 4 See Tabellini [22] and Algan and Cahuc [2] . 5 See Stevenson and Wolfers [21] for a survey data analysis based on Gallup. 6 This aspect has been discussed extensively in recent months due to the emphasis given to the forward guidance policy.
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Two novel aspects distinguish our work. First, we model the endogenous formation of trust in a game-theoretic interaction between a continuum of atomistic and betrayal averse agents who choose whether to trust (or not to trust) and a large opportunistic policy maker, who chooses whether to cheat or not to cheat. Notice that much of the previous literature analyzed the e¤ects of exogenous changes of trust on the economy: not the reverse or the mutual causality. To model agents'uncertainty about policy maker opportunism, we assume that nature draws randomly the monetary advantage gained when cheating: the higher is the population probability of drawing the opportunistic policy maker, the lower is the threshold degree of betrayal aversion. In this respect, our model also draws upon the literature on evolutionary game theory in which equilibrium outcomes are determined by the frequency in which competing strategies are found in the population.
Ultimately trust a¤ects agents' stochastic discount factors, namely the shadow price that agents attach to risky outcomes. In a second step, we introduce trust-driven preferences within an aggregate dynamic model 7 : in this context trust translates into a time-varying variable which a¤ects policy actions and is a¤ected by them as well as from the macroeconomic equilibria. This brings us to the second novel aspect of our analysis: our macroeconomic model with endogenous trust formation allows us to account for the mutual causality between trust on the one side and economic outcomes and/or policy actions on the other. While our model has a more general applicability to policy analysis, in this paper we focus on trust towards the monetary authority and its link with the monetary transmission mechanism.
Our trust game abstracts from reputational considerations: agents and policy makers interact once and do not learn from repeated interactions. Although sequential interactions can determine coordinating behavior which are akin to trust, we aim at exploiting the e¤ects that a given probability of opportunistic behavior in policy making has on agents'equilibrium perception of risk. In societies in which the probability of drawing the sel…sh policy maker is higher, citizens will be less trusting and even good policies might loose e¢ cacy 8 . Second, we take policy institutions as given: more speci…cally, we assume that policy shall be conducted under commitment according to the mandate written in the formal statute. This of course does not exclude the possibility that nature 7 We model monetary policy so as to be non-neutral.draws a more sel…sh policy maker: while central banks'credibility might be dictated and credited by the statutory rules of the mandate, reliability of its governor is ultimately a random personality trait.
Beyond the theoretical foundations, our paper aims at grounding quantitatively the e¤ects and the importance of trust. We do so by examining the interaction of trust and the monetary transmission mechanism through both a quantitative exploration of our macro model and an empirical analysis.
We …rst conduct a quantitative assessment of the macro model, by simulating impulse response functions of our model to various shocks (a technology shock, a monetary policy shock, a supply side shock to in ‡ation, and a trust shock). A number of results arise. We …nd, for instance, that a monetary restriction reduces trust on impact, as the performance of the economy provides an indirect signal of the policy maker reliability. A cost-push shock that increases in ‡ation also reduces trust in the monetary authority: as in ‡ation deviates from the announced policy target, agents perceive the monetary authority as less reliable. On the other side, a trust shock (an exogenous increase) is expansionary. Generally speaking, two main results characterize the transmission mechanism. First, an (exogenous) increase in trust generally reduces the shadow price of future risk, as measured by the stochastic discount factor, and increases aggregate demand as households' propensity to consume increases. Second, an increase in the equilibrium level of trust (as triggered by any other shock) tends to reduce (compared to the standard macro model) future in ‡ation expectations as agents are more con…dent about the monetary authority's ability to control future expectations. At last, we compare our model to an equivalent macro model without trust: we …nd that the presence of time-varying trust works as an additional propagation mechanism as the responses of all macroeconomic variables (to all shocks) are more ampli…ed.
The empirical analysis examines the interaction between trust, macroeconomic variables, and monetary policy using data from the Eurobarometer surveys. We focus on the euro area: the newly created central bank provides a natural experiment to assess the role of evolving trust. Several challenges arise in our empirical analysis. The …rst is an intrinsic endogeneity between the two sets of variables: the e¢ cacy of monetary policy and its control over future expectations are high when the monetary authority is trustworthy; on reverse a successful monetary policy does increase the 4 level of public trust. A second issue lies in the distinction between long run and short run e¤ects.
Generally speaking, monetary policy has short run e¤ects, hence, if a link exists between trust and monetary policy then it must become apparent at high frequencies. To account for this fact, we …rst de-trend our measure of trust. In a second step, we establish the link between the cyclical component of trust (net of the long run determinants) and the monetary transmission mechanism.
Our empirical analysis highlights three main …ndings. First, a positive shock to trust increases real GDP and improves the in ‡ation-output trade-o¤. This …nding captures the lubricant role of trust as celebrated in Arrow [4] . Second, an increase in trust reduces in ‡ation and generally loosens the monetary stance. Overall, the transmission mechanism of the trust shock, as well as of the monetary policy and of the in ‡ation shock, are in line with the ones featured by our model.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, which includes the trust game as well as the full- ‡edged dynamic monetary model with the endogenous determination of trust. Section 3 discusses model results. Section 4 provides empirical evidence of the link between trust and monetary policy and section 5 concludes. Appendices, …gures, and tables follow.
The Model
The eventual goal is that of introducing endogenous trust formation into an otherwise standard macro model. We start by outlining the trust game between the agents populating the economy and the monetary authority.
Baseline Trust Game
The interaction between the agents in the economy and the monetary authority is modeled as a trust game. We start by a simple setup 9 in which there is a single agent and a single monetary authority and perfect knowledge about their respective types. Later on we will extend the game by considering a continuum of agents with unitary mass on the one side and a single monetary authority with randomly chosen type on the other.
The baseline game is an extensive form two stage trust game in which each player has perfect knowledge of his own and the other player's type. The game can be described mathematically by the 9 See also Güth and Kliemt [11] . 5 following tuple hN; H; P; ( i )i which describes players, histories, player functions, and preferences.
The players N = f1; 2g are an agent, player 1, who can play the actions a 1 = fT; N T g where T denotes "trust" and N T denotes "not to trust", and the monetary authority, player 2, whose actions are a 2 = fT W; N T W g ; with T W being trustworthy behavior and N T W being the non trustworthy behavior. The set of possible histories is given by H = f?; (N T; N T W ); (T; T W ); (T; N T W )g, where ? indicates the initial node. Player 1 is the proposer, while player 2 is the responder, therefore the player functional form, which assigns a player to each node (or history h) of the game, reads as follows: P (?) = 1; P (h) = 2: We denote by x h the payo¤ of player 1 after each history and by y h the payo¤ of player 2. Payo¤s are assigned as follows: (x 1 ; y 1 ) for history h = (N T; N T W ), (x 2 ; y 2 ) for history h = (T; T W ), and (x 3 ; y 3 ) for history h = (T; N T W ). The game has one Nash equilibrium and the extensive form of the game is depicted in …gure 1.
P roposition 1:
Under the preference ordering (T; T W ) 1 (N T; N T W ) 1 (T; N T W ) and (T; N T W ) 2 (T; T W ) 2 (N T; N T W ) the history (N T; N T W ) represents the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium while the history (T; T W ) is Pareto dominant.
P roof: The above preference ordering implies the following restrictions on the payo¤s: y 1 < y 2 < y 3 and x 3 < x 1 < x 2 . Using backward induction and conditional on player 1 playing T player 2 will choose to play N T W: In anticipation player 1 will choose to play N T as x 3 < x 1 .
The preference ordering de…ned above is meant to capture the tension between coordination and competition arising in the trust game. If the agents would choose the equilibrium by maximizing the joint surplus, they would indeed choose (T; T W ). Player 2, however, has the advantage of the second mover and has an incentive to exploit that advantage as y 2 < y 3 :
Extended Trust Game
The above game has a predictable equilibrium and does not capture the evolving nature of trust.
Therefore we extend the game to capture the idea that the equilibrium level of trust does depend upon the game-theoretic interaction of heterogeneous players'types. More speci…cally, we assume that agents in the economy feature di¤erential costs of betrayal and that nature can draw policy maker types with di¤erent degrees of reliability. Atomistic agents in our economy remain the …rst movers. However, we now add incomplete information in that we assume that they do not know ex ante the degree of policy maker reliability and should therefore choose their move under uncertainty.
There is a continuum of atomistic agents, the …rst movers. Agents are symmetric expect for their individual degree of betrayal aversion, i.e. the dis-utility they receive from being cheated. The heterogeneity introduced above is crucial in ruling out extreme coordination equilibria, in which all agents decide either to trust or not to trust. Those equilibria would indeed deliver aggregate levels of trust of 100% or 0%, respectively. Our goal is instead to obtain an intermediate level of trust which is ex post endogenously determined by the players'interaction. such that the probability density function is 1=2m.
Notice that we are abstracting from reputational costs. Notice that the assumption of lack of memory is sensible in the case of monetary policy.
In the statutes of most central banks the governor is appointed for a …xed term, so contrary to politicians he does not face reputational costs in re-elections. Once the central banker is appointed and since atomistic agents are uncertain about the type, the equilibrium of the game is determined by comparing expected payo¤s which are unconditional to past histories or to future expectations of the course of actions: this is explained below in this section. Later on the game of interaction will be inserted within a full- ‡edged in…nite horizon macro model in which the fraction of trusting agents will become time-varying and will depend upon macroeconomic conditions, which are an indirect signal of the central banker reliability: a fall in the fraction of trusting agents will have the consequence of reducing the e¢ cacy of the monetary policy stance.
We shall now reconsider the determination of the subgame perfect equilibrium based on the new random payo¤s structure. As in the baseline game each single atomistic agent decides, as …rst mover, whether to play T or N T . If the agent decides to play N T , the central bank will respond N T W and the game ends with payo¤s (x 1 ; y 1 ). Conditional on choosing T , the central bank has the choice between playing T W; with resulting payo¤s (x 2 ; y 2 ); or N T W; with payo¤s (x 2 b; y 3 + ).
We shall now introduce the following assumption that will allow us to retain a positive probability for both either the (T; T W ) or the (N T; N T W ) equilibrium.
Assumption 3. y 1 < y 3 < y 2 and x 1 < x 2 < x 1 + 1.
Lemma 1. Conditional on T in expectation, T W is a dominant strategy for the central bank.
P roof: The result follows from the assumption that y 3 < y 2 . As the random variable has zero mean, in expectation playing T W is a dominant strategy for the central bank as y 2 >
Lemma 2: The probability that the central bank will play N T W increases with the variability of the distribution of . 2m : This probability rises when m increases and since the variance of the distribution, which is m 2 3 , only rises when m increases, it follows that the probability of choosing N T W increases with the variance of the distribution of :
The above lemma has a simple intuition: when the variance of central banker's types increases the fraction of unreliable ones increases too.
Lemma 3: The strategy T will not be a dominant strategy for all agents in the economy.
P roof: Betrayal aversion, b, lies in the unit interval. The assumption that x 1 < x 2 implies that for the least betrayal averse agent T is a dominant strategy. For the most betrayal averse agent, however, the assumption x 2 < x 1 + 1 implies that T is no dominant strategy anymore.
The extensive form of the extended trust game is depicted in …gure 2.
Recall that the game features incomplete information on the side of agents, as they do not know with certainty the type of central banker that the nature will draw. For this reason, each agent will choose optimally its action by comparing expected payo¤s based on prior probability densities.
The agent will trust, T; if the expected payo¤ of doing so is larger than or equal to x 1 and vice versa. The expected payo¤ of choosing to trust, T; for the agents, E f A g ; is given by:
where F (:) denotes the cumulative distribution function conformable with the distributional assumption of . Noting that
, it then follows that:
Lemma 4: Agents will choose T if: Figure 3 : Graphical illustration of the relation between the degree of betrayal aversion, b, and the agents'decisions.
P roof: The proof of the above lemma follows from the fact that T is the dominant strategy
Recall that in our economy there is a continuum of agents and that b 2 [0; 1] identi…es the degree of betrayal aversion of each individual agent: the threshold, b, therefore identi…es the marginal agent (hence the overall fraction of agents)
which will choose to trust.
Assumption 4: It is assumed that m > y 2 y 3 :
The above assumption guarantees that b = 2m(x 2 x 1 )
; of the uniform distribution for must be chosen so that the central bank has an incentive to choose N T W at least for some high realizations of . Depending on the speci…c value of b, the agent will either decide to trust or not to trust. This relation is depicted in …gure 3.
Corollary 1: The fraction of agents that plays T will solely be determined by the degree of betrayal aversion of the marginal agent, b. More precisely:
P roposition 2: In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game with incomplete information (and also the one of …nitely many repetitions of the game) the strategy pro…le of player 2, given = b; reads as follows:
P roof: The subgame perfect equilibrium is found by backward induction. In the second period, given the fraction of agents that chooses to trust, = b; and for given realization of , the central bank will then play T W against N T W if and only if y 2 y 3 + . In the …rst period, given the prior beliefs on the realization of ; the fraction of agents that chooses to trust is given as from Corollary 1.
Notice that the outcome of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium crucially depends upon the degree of betrayal aversion. The lower the degree of betrayal aversion, the higher is the single agent's payo¤ when the central bank is not trustworthy. Also, the higher is the degree of betrayal aversion of the marginal agent, the higher is the fraction of agents that decides to trust.
Payo¤s Aggregation
Before embedding our trust game into a standard monetary model, we need to compute the agents' aggregate payo¤s. As all agents are symmetric except for b, aggregation delivers the following realized payo¤ for the representative agent, R A :
where I[:] denotes an indicator function that is equal to one if > y 2 y 3 and zero otherwise.
Note that the indicator function produces a discontinuity in this expression. However, I[:] can be approximated by a continuous transition function which renders standard approximation techniques feasible. The transition function may read t t( ; y 2 ; y 3 ; ) = 1=[1 + exp( (
The realized payo¤ of the central bank, R CB , reads as follows:
1 0 See similarly Bayoumi et al. [5] . 12 
Implementing the Trust Game in a Macro Model
Our goal is to embed the trust game within a standard monetary/macro model. To this purpose, the next task is the formulation of aggregate preferences whose associated payo¤s feature a ranking comparable to the one assumed in the extended version of the trust game.
As explained earlier the assumption x 2 > x 1 is crucial to obtain well behaved equilibria, both in the baseline and also the extended trust game. Having two distinct payo¤s x 1 and x 2 , however, complicates the implementation of the trust game within an aggregate/macro model. To simplify things we therefore introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 5: x 2 x 1 and that > 1:
The above assumption ensures that x 2 > x 1 . The parameter represents the bene…ts for agents of coordinating on the cooperative trustworthy equilibrium. The higher , the higher the monetary payo¤ when playing the T strategy.
Notice that the central bank's payo¤s parameters will not directly enter the agents'behavioral equations. We can therefore impose the following simplifying assumption.
Assumption 6. y 3 y 2 2 < 0: Given the above assumption it is possible to de…ne 1 2m( 1)
Lemma 5: Given assumptions 5 and 6, the aggregate fraction of trusting agents is given by:
and the aggregate agents' payo¤ is given by:
where 1 = 1; 2 = 1, and 3 ( ) = I[ > 2 ]=2.
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P roof: The calculation of the aggregate payo¤ in the above lemma is obtained as follows:
To provide direct implementation of the above lemma, let's assume that each agent in the extended trust game has the following exponential Bernoulli utility function
where C denotes consumption, j refers to the location of the agent on the unit interval, and is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion.
After rearranging and adding a time subscript, t, as well as an additive trust shock process, " t 11 , the key expressions are given by:
To understand the e¤ect of trust overall and on the marginal utility we resort on the following two lemmas.
Previous literature (see, for instance, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales [12] ) pointed at the link between risk aversion and exogenous changes in trust. In our model, trust is an endogenous timevarying variable. As one would indeed expect there is a double causality by which a decrease in trust increases risk aversion and as agents become more averse to losses they also experience a loss in con…dence on the e¢ cacy of macroeconomic policy. Despite this it is of interest to assess also in our model the e¤ects of exogenous changes in trust on risk aversion. This can be done by conducting comparative static analyses between risk aversion and the main deep parameter characterizing trust, namely : Recall that ceteris paribus, the higher , the higher is the fraction of trusting agents. We can therefore assess the link between marginal utility, risk aversion, and .
Lemma 6: The derivative @U A (C t ; t ; t )=@ > 0 when t 2 and the central bank chooses to play T W . In the opposite case where t > 2 , the sign of the partial derivative depends upon the levels of C t and t and is positive when 2 2 (1 e Ct ) > t .
P roof: Depending on the speci…c realization of t , the partial derivative of U A (C t ; t ; t ) with respect to reads as follows:
Intuitively, an increase in and therefore an increase in trust increases the welfare of the representative agent, provided that the uncertainty surrounding the central banker's type is not too large.
Corollary 2: The second derivative of the utility function with respect to is positive when t 2 . When t > 2 , the sign of the partial derivative depends upon the levels of C t and t and is positive when 2 2 (1 e Ct ) > t .
Changes in the aggregate level of trust induced by changes in will also in ‡uence the risk aversion of the representative agent. We measure absolute risk aversion with the Arrow-Pratt metric, where we de…ne ARA t @ 2 U A (C t ; t ; t ) @C 2 t @U A (C t ; t ; t ) @C t . In our model the latter can be computed as follows:
Lemma 7: Evaluated at the steady-state of consumption and for the calibrated primitive trust model parameters = 1:28; 2 = 0:345; and m = 0:5, the derivative @ARA(C t ; t ; t )=@ < 0:
As we will eventually analyze trust in a general equilibrium business cycle model, the above metric will depend upon the parameter calibration. For the baseline calibration (see calibration section for a detailed description of the parameter choice) we uncover the negative relation between ARA t and trust as detailed in lemma 7. Intuitively, an increase in and therefore an increase in aggregate trust reduces risk aversion of the representative agent. This result parallels the one previously found in the literature which analyzed the link between risk aversion and exogenous changes in trust in partial equilibrium models.
Equations 9 and 10 together summarize the aggregate payo¤ of the trust game and shall be added to a standard monetary model to account for the link between equilibrium trust and the policy transmission mechanism. Few considerations are worth notice at this stage. The level of consumption, C t , determines the betrayal aversion of the marginal agent in the economy, b t : This in turn determines the aggregate level of equilibrium trust, t , using equation 9. Notice indeed that trust in our model is a time-varying variable that ‡uctuates in response to shocks: a shock to technology, a change in the monetary policy stance, or an exogenous increase in prices, all trigger a change in public trust towards the policy maker. Second, ‡uctuations in the aggregate equilibrium level of trust a¤ect the utility of the representative agent through their impact on 10, hence they will a¤ect the agents'stochastic discount factors, namely the subjective price of risk. Intuitively, when aggregate trust increases, the price of future risk falls. Changes in the price of future risk do a¤ect the strength of the transmission mechanism. This is also the sense in which the monetary transmission mechanism, operating via the impact of the policy rate on the agents' consumption Euler and/or …rms' future pro…ts, changes when the level of aggregate trust changes. We will return on this point later.
Aggregate Economy
The Although the macro model is a fully dynamic one we shall recall that the underlying game is played once and under the assumption of lack of memory. This allows us to maintain the structure of the game unchanged across periods, notwithstanding the fact that the trust variable will change over time as it displays as a function of aggregate demand. As the mass of trusting atomistic agents changes in response to macroeconomic conditions, the aggregate marginal utility, hence the stochastic discount factor, will change too as per Lemma 6 in the previous section. The ensuing time variations in the marginal utility will have an impact on the strength and persistence of the monetary transmission mechanism.
Household
There is an in…nitely lived representative household who maximizes the expected discounted sum of utilities
where 0 < < 1 is a constant discount factor, c t , t , and n t denote consumption, aggregate central bank trust, and labor hours, respectively. E 0 is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time 0 and t is the realization of the stochastic dispersion of the central bank type. Real income in period t is composed of wage income,
Wt
Pt n t , bond holdings including interest rate payments, (1 + i t 1 )
Pt , and real aggregate …rm pro…ts, t , as …rms are assumed to be owned by the representative household. Notice that in our speci…cation with a separable utility trust a¤ects the consumption utility but not the labor dis-utility: see Appendix A that speci…es the circumstances under which this assumption is valid. The household's budget constraint in real terms reads
where P t is the price level, w t = Wt Pt , and T t denotes lump sum real tax payments. Maximizing 13 subject to 14 with respect to c, n, and B gives rise to the following …rst order conditions:
where lower case letters denote real variables,
, and U A c is the marginal utility of consumption which depends upon the evolution of trust:
Notice that the ‡uctuations in trust a¤ect agents'stochastic discount factors through its e¤ect on the marginal utility of consumption. We will return on this point later.
Notice also that by the consumption Euler equation it follows that the Fisher equation reads
with r t being the real interest rate.
Final Good Firm and Intermediate Good Firms
There is a representative …nal good-producing …rm that operates under the following production ] in order to produce y t units of the …nal good. Pro…t maximization then implies the …nal goodproducing …rm's demand for variety i:
where the parameter " represents the demand elasticity of individual varieties.
Each intermediate good-producing …rm i has monopolistic power and leverage in setting the price. In changing prices it faces a quadratic cost equal to
where the parameter # captures the degree of nominal price rigidity. The higher #, the more costly are price changes for the individual …rm and the more sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices. The case of ‡exible prices is nested and requires setting # = 0. Each …rm i assembles n t (i) units of labor from the representative household in period t in order to operate a production technology for a distinct variety i of an intermediate good:
Each …rm chooses a sequence fn t (i); P t (i)g ; taking the nominal wage, W t , as given in order to 18 maximize expected discounted real pro…ts:
subject to the …nal good-producing …rm's demand constraint for each variety i. 0;t
is the household's stochastic discount factor and mc t (i) the real marginal cost associated with …rm i. Firms owned by the household discount future pro…ts through a stochastic discount factor with the latter being a¤ected by trust. An increase in trust induces a reduction in future expectations of in ‡ation, which in turn through the Euler on consumption, 15, triggers a fall in the stochastic discount factor. As …rms perceive the policy makers as more reliable and capable of anchoring future expectations of in ‡ation, they become less concerned about future pro…ts and tend to link prices more to current macroeconomic conditions.
The following …rst order conditions hold, after aggregation and after imposing a symmetric equilibrium:
where F n denotes the marginal product of labor.
The last expression is the nonlinear forward-looking Phillips curve in which deviations of the real marginal cost from its steady-state value are the driving force of in ‡ation. Notice that the evolution of trust a¤ects the Phillips cure and in ‡ation through the …rms'stochastic discount factor:
as it declines in response to an increase in trust the dependence of current in ‡ation from the future one declines, while its dependence from current marginal costs conditions rise.
Equilibrium Conditions and the Monetary Authority
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that the production of goods equals the sum of private consumption, public spending, and the costs associated with price changes:
The monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate, 1 + i t , according to a Taylor rule of the form:
where i ss , ss , and y ss denote steady-state values of the respective variable and " m t is a mildly persistent additive interest rate shock. 
Def inition
2: A competitive equilibrium in our economy is a sequence of variables fy t ; c t ; n t ; mc t ; t ; t ; i t g 1 t=0 that, for given initial wealth, B 0 , and for given sequence of prices fw t g
Calibration and Shock Processes
Preference parameters. Time is measured in quarters. Labor hours are normalized to unity and the parameter { is calibrated such that the steady-state value of labor hours, n ss , is equal to 0:3.
The discount factor is calibrated to 0:99, a value compatible with a 4% annual rate of interest.
Risk aversion of the atomistic agents in the extended trust game is calibrated to 2, generating a degree of relative risk aversion at the steady-state that is consistent with estimated values (see, for instance, Goeree and Holt [9] , Goeree et al. [10] , and Holt and Laury [13] from experimental evidence).
Production parameters. Production is given by a Cobb-Douglas function F (n t ) = y t = a t n t with = 1. Calibration of the Phillips curve is done by comparing the slop of the log-linear version of the Phillips curve presented above with the log-linear version of the Phillips curve under the Calvo-Yun approach, for which the slope coe¢ cient can be expressed as [18] . The cost-push shock has a standard deviation of 0:01 and an autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0:9 as in Smets and Wouters [20] . Finally, the trust shock is estimated through an AR(1) model with drift using a semi-annual time series of aggregate ECB trust based on the Eurobarometer survey data.
The time series contains data for all 17 euro area countries from 1999:S1 to 2011:S1. Each country is considered in the sample from the country's respective entry to the euro area. The functional form showing the (highly signi…cant) point estimates reads as e t = 0:101 + 0:844e t 1 + " t . Recall, however, that we simulate a quarterly model. Hence, the parameter estimates of the AR(1) process using semi-annual data need to be adjusted accordingly. Let a circum ‡ex denote variables with quarterly data frequency. An equivalent AR(1) model can then be formulated asê t = (1 + )d + 2 ê t 2 + " t 1 +" t ,where d and refer to drift and autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the AR (1) model with quarterly data frequency, respectively. Given the equivalence of both models, it follows that d = 0:053, = 0:92, and = 0:045 provided that the estimated variance of the regression residuals is equal to 0.004. The adjusted parameters imply an unconditional long-run average of aggregate ECB trust of 0:65. The calibration of the trust model parameters is chosen such that the steady-state level of aggregate trust, ss , matches this value.
Quantitative Analysis
We now simulate our model in response to a number of shocks to assess the link between trust and the transmission mechanism of macroeconomic and policy shocks. We will consider traditional macroeconomic and policy shocks (technology, monetary policy, and cost-push shocks) as well as the newly estimated trust shock. Finally …gure 8 shows impulse responses of selected variables in our model to the newly estimated trust shock. The increase in trust is largely expansionary. Generally speaking, output increases and in ‡ation falls, the latter due to the fall in in ‡ation expectations. We can examine the interaction between the evolution of trust and monetary policy by analyzing the consumption Euler equation, which can be written as follows:
.
From the impulse responses following a trust shock we know that the nominal interest rate decreases and the real interest rate 1 + r t increases (not shown as a separate impulse response). As a result, the stochastic discount factor decreases. This can only happen if in ‡ation expectations decrease over proportionally relative to the decrease in the nominal interest rate. This is what we would expect following (positive) trust shocks. Intuitively, as trust rises, the price of future risk falls: as a consequence, households increase their consumption demand. As the agents perceive an improvement in the in ‡ation-output trade-o¤, in ‡ation falls in anticipation despite the increase in 23 aggregate demand.
Empirical Evidence
The aim of the empirical analysis is to evaluate the link between trust and macroeconomic performance in general and between trust and the monetary transmission mechanism more speci…cally.
Our trust variable will be constructed using the answers from the Eurobarometer surveys. Some econometric issues deserve discussion.
First, we shall distinguish between the long run determinants and the short run ‡uctuations in trust. Previous empirical analysis focused on long run e¤ects (such as GDP growth) of exogenous changes in trust and assessed the power of well entrenched institutions in promoting trust building.
Our focus is on the mutual link between trust and policy actions which manifests at short run business cycle frequencies. Hence, we de-trend (with Hodrick-Prescott …lter) our proxy variable for trust in order to disentangle the short run ‡uctuations of trust net of the long run determinants.
In the second stage, we asses the link between trust and monetary policy using time series analysis.
A second issue to consider is the potential endogeneity between macroeconomic performance and time-varying trust. A high level of trust may increase the willingness of households to consume and of …rms to invest. On the other hand, good macroeconomic performance might be an indicator of the well-functioning of macroeconomic policy, which in turn improves agents'beliefs in the policy maker reliability. This mutual causality implies that regressing a measure of macroeconomic and/or monetary policy indicators on a measure of trust or vice versa is inappropriate. We address the temporal endogeneity issue by employing VAR estimation techniques.
Our empirical analysis will also analyze the e¤ects of a novel shock to trust. For this reason, a third issue arises related to the identi…cation assumptions of such a shock. In this respect, we maintain a conservative agnostic view by resorting on Generalized Impulse Response Functions (see Koop et al. [15] and Pesaran and Shin [16] ). We will return on this point later on.
Eurobarometer Surveys and Macroeconomic Data
We use data from Eurobarometer surveys which are conducted on behalf of the European Commission at least twice a year in all European Union (EU) member countries for a sample period that goes from 1999:S1 to 2011:S1. The surveys cover a rich set of demographic characteristics in order to monitor the social and political attitudes of households in all EU member countries.
More speci…cally, we combine a selected set of 25 Eurobarometer surveys in order to build a unique semi-annual repeated cross section from 1999 to 2011. One strength of the surveys is that several questions on attitudes towards European institutions are asked at least twice a year, which makes it possible to construct our main variable of interest, namely the perceived trust in the ECB, in all data sets. The surveys ask the participants: Average (EONIA) rate refers to the average rate within the respective semester. Semester data were constructed following Roth et al. [17] in order to match the Eurobarometer surveys with macroeconomic data. Table 2 contains summary statistics of the variables used.
Estimation Strategy
As mentioned earlier, we expect the trust variable to feature both long run and short run dynamics.
Ultimately, however, we are interested in explaining, through a time series analysis, the link between trust (net of long run dynamics) and macroeconomic ‡uctuations and/or monetary policy rates, which manifests at business cycle frequencies. To disentangle those two components, we aggregate our binary measure of trust, obtained through survey data, on a country and time period basis and de-trend the resulting time series using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter (standard smoothing parameter of 400). In the second stage, we asses the link between trust and monetary policy using standard time series analysis. The cyclical component of trust is also included in a VAR estimation together with standard macro indicators in order to explain the link with the business cycle and the monetary 25 transmission mechanism.
Time Series Analysis of Trust: Main Issues and Results
To start in …gure 9, we show the evolution of the aggregated trust variables for a selected number of countries (Germany, France, Italy, Greece, and Spain) and for the whole sample period 1999:S1 Table 1 shows coe¢ cients of correlation between GDP (y t ) and ECB trust ( t ) using semi-annual leads and lags. Table 1 : Coe¢ cients of correlation between GDP (y t ) and ECB trust ( t ) using semi-annual leads and lags.
Next we use the cyclical component of trust in a VAR estimation. As mentioned earlier, the empirical assessment of the link between trust on the one side and macroeconomic and monetary policy variables on the other is done using VAR estimation. This allows us to partly address the temporal double causality between the two sets of variables. We rely on standard VAR models of 26 the form:
where Y t and X t are vectors of endogenous and exogenous variables, respectively. A(L) is a matrix polynomial of order k in the lag operator L, B is a coe¢ cient vector conformable with the dimension of X t , and " t are the regression residuals. As the semi-annual sample for the euro area is rather short (1999:S1-2011:S1), country-based VAR estimations are not feasible. Therefore we estimate VAR models on pooled data, controlling for country-speci…c heterogeneity, and assuming slope homogeneity 13 .
The VAR models are estimated using ECB trust and several macroeconomic indicators. Here we focus on a parsimonious VAR speci…cation which includes ECB trust, real GDP, HICP in ‡ation, and the policy rate. Several robustness checks have been conducted: the main …ndings highlighted here remain robust across di¤erent speci…cations. A few additional notes are worth mentioning regarding the VAR speci…cation and the choice of variables. We proxy the policy rate for the euro area using the EONIA rate. There are several reasons for which the EONIA rate is a good proxy of the monetary stance. One, among many others, is that this rate is well suited to capture the monetary stance in times of crisis. Recently, indeed the Eurosystem has experienced a signi…cant number of unconventional monetary policy measures 14 . The EONIA rate fell much below the interest rate on the main re…nancing operations, showing that this rate is particularly responsive to monetary conditions. Finally, the sample is split into two, the full sample and the non-crisis sample. A dating of the beginning of the current crisis is to a certain extent arbitrary. We date the beginning of the crisis conservatively and de…ne the …nancial distress of August 2007 (inter alia associated with the United States subprime mortgage market and severe tensions in interbank markets around the globe) as the starting point of the active phase of the crisis 15 . The general speci…cation for the VAR will therefore include ECB trust, real GDP, HICP in ‡ation, and the EONIA rate. In what follows, we focus on the empirical impulse response functions for the non-1 3 A similar procedure is in Ciccarelli et al. [6] . 1 4 Among other things, commercial banks in the euro area were o¤ered liquidity assistance through a …xed-rate tender procedure with full allotment at the interest rate on the main re…nancing operations starting in October 2008. 1 5 See, for instance, Duchin et al. [7] . The …eldwork of the Eurobarometer 68.1 survey was conducted in September and October 2007. As such, we assign data corresponding to the second semester of 2007 (i.e. 2007:S2) to the crisis period. 27 crisis sample. There are several widely accepted reasons for excluding crises from those business cycle analyses. In our particular case we also observe that ‡uctuations of macro and …nancial variables during the crisis period are inter alia mostly driven by a …nancial shock that is in fact exogenous to our VAR model and cannot be modeled in light of the rather limited semi-annual sample for the euro area. It shall further be noted that during the recent …nancial and sovereign debt crises, both ECB trust and real GDP fell substantially below the respective trend value and the euro area experienced an unprecedented loosening of the monetary stance. The resulting strong positive correlation of the key model variables, as generated through factors that are exogenous to our VAR model, would bias the estimation results. Finally, notice that the VAR speci…cation contains one lag for each endogenous variable.
One last issue related to the VAR speci…cation concerns the shock identi…cation. There is limited conventional wisdom or little economic theory that would justify one particular Cholesky ordering for further impulse response inference. For this and other reasons, we decided to resort upon the Generalized Impulse Response Functions methodology (GIRF hereafter). Appealing properties of GIRF, compared to orthogonalized impulse response functions in the spirit of Sims [19] , are that GIRF do not require an orthogonalization of shocks using the Cholesky decomposition and that the ordering of the endogenous variables in the VAR model is irrelevant for further inference. by asterisks. In commenting the results of the simulations we will also evaluate the ability of the model in …tting the transmission mechanism highlighted by the empirical analysis. Notice, however, that the comparison between the VAR GIRF and the model impulse responses will obviously not be perfect as the latter are orthogonalized while the former are not. We will therefore focus on a qualitative comparison (the direction of the impulse responses) and of the overall transmission mechanism of shocks between the data and the model. We will discuss the cases in which the model and the VAR estimates are close also in quantitative terms.
A shock to the EONIA rate signi…cantly depresses ECB trust upon impact and persistently increases the EONIA rate up to semester six. Real GDP falls below trend starting in semester three while the shock turns out to be expansionary in the very short run. The fall in trust following a contractionary monetary policy mirrors quite precisely the theoretical equivalent. Notice that our results also entail the so-called price puzzle, namely the short-run increase in prices following a monetary contraction, that has been frequently documented in previous empirical research on monetary policy shocks in a VAR framework.
A shock to HICP in ‡ation depresses both ECB trust and output in the short run. The theoretical equivalent (impulse response to the cost-push shock shown through asterisks) is able to replicate those …ndings. A one-time increase in ECB trust has three main e¤ects. First, it signi…-cantly increases real GDP from semester …ve until nine: an increase in public con…dence provides an expansionary boosts to the economy akin to that triggered by the Keynesian animal spirits. An increase in ECB trust also reduces the prospects of future in ‡ation growth: the public believes that the monetary authority is able to control future in ‡ation more closely and at the expenses of lower output costs. The output-in ‡ation trade-o¤ improves. In anticipation in ‡ation falls and the gain in credibility allows the monetary authority to loosen the monetary stance. Hence, the EONIA rate is signi…cantly reduced. We attribute this …nding once again to the fact that an increase in trust improves the in ‡ation-output trade-o¤ and in turn it enlarges the scope for maneuvering a loosening of the policy stance 17 . The theoretical impulse responses are again consistent with the VAR evidence. In particular, the theoretical impulse responses to trust shocks also show persistent reductions of in ‡ation and the policy rate whose magnitude are similar compared to the empirical counterparts. A shock to ECB trust is, also in line with model results, expansionary. However, the e¤ect seems to be smaller in the data. This can be explained by the fact that our GIRF also contain elements from the other shock distributions that tend to dilute the e¤ect of each individual shock.
As a further robustness exercise, we analyzed impulse responses to orthogonalized shocks using the Cholesky decomposition in the spirit of Sims [19] . Figures for this are reported in a separate appendix available upon request. As stated before, the ordering of our ECB trust variable is not straightforward. We …x the ordering of the standard macro variables in way that it is consistent with the VAR literature. More precisely, we order output …rst followed by in ‡ation and then the policy rate. Hence, four alternative ordering positions of ECB trust are to be analyzed.
For the shock to HICP in ‡ation, impulse responses for output and the policy rate are as expected, namely output is signi…cantly reduced and the EONIA rate increases signi…cantly up to semester two in all cases. For the trust response, two out of the four orderings show the signi…cant reduction in ECB trust following the exogenous increase in prices as was the case for GIRF while the reduction is insigni…cant in the remaining two cases.
A shock to the EONIA rate signi…cantly depresses output regardless of the variable ordering.
In all cases the price puzzle also observed with GIRF materializes while the policy rate response turns negative in the medium run.
Finally and most importantly, orthogonal ECB trust shocks signi…cantly loosen the monetary stance as was the case before regardless of which of the four orderings is used. Similarly, a trust shock is expansionary in the medium run in all cases. In ‡ation falls, signi…cantly so in two out of the four cases. Summing up, key results inferred from GIRF also carry over when using orthogonal shocks. One generally valid message is that the trust shock is expansionary and loosens the policy stance regardless of the Cholesky ordering at hand.
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Conclusions
Large crises tend to revive the idea that trust in large institutions and policy making is highly sensitive to aggregate conditions and ‡uctuates at high frequencies. We conduct an empirical analysis showing the two way causality between public trust in policy making and the e¢ cacy of the monetary policies. We laid down a simple macroeconomic model which relies on game-theoretic foundations of the aggregate equilibrium level of trust. The quantitative results of the model, which are in line with our empirical evidence, help us to deepen the understanding of the link between trust and the monetary transmission mechanism.
plays T W with probability one and that the agents'payo¤s are as stated in the main text. It will then be bene…cial for the individual agent to choose T if:
and vice versa.
Assume that there is a representative agent who optimally chooses aggregate labor supply, n, that is distributed equally among the agents and inelastically across strategy pro…les in the trust game (i.e. regardless of the agents'/the central bank's decisions). Denote this individual labor supply asñ j =ñ 8 j where j refers to the location of the agent on the unit interval. Furthermore, assume that v(ñ) is an increasing function inñ representing the dis-utility of supplying labor, that individual agents are homogeneous with respect to v(ñ), and that the dis-utility of labor enters additively in the agents' utility functions. In the same setup as before, it then follows that it is bene…cial for the individual agent to choose T if:
and vice versa. Hence, incorporating labor in such a way does not a¤ect the agents' decisions in the trust game and can therefore be abstracted from at this stage.
Appendix B. Impulse Responses for Di¤erent Values of
Additional insights of the e¤ect of trust on the transmission of shocks can be gained by inspecting impulse responses to technology shocks for di¤erent values of . Recall that this a primitive parameter in the determination of trust: as increases, agents are more prone to coordinate and the average level of trust in the economy rises. The …gure shows the impulse responses of selected variables to a one standard deviation technology shock for the model with trust and for di¤erent values of . As rises, all variables become more responsive to the shock: an increase in the average level of trust reduces risk aversion (as shown in Lemma 7); households'consumption demand becomes then more responsive to shocks as the consumption smoothing desire is dampened. As a result, the productivity boom is more pronounced under a high value of , which implies a high average level of trust. 
Appendix C. Generalized Impulse Response Functions
Consider a VAR model of the form:
where Y t and X t are vectors of endogenous and exogenous variables, respectively. A i , i = 1; :::; k, and B denote coe¢ cient vectors conformable with the dimensions of Y t and X t , and " t are the regression residuals. Provided that Y t is covariance stationary, the VAR model can equivalently be expressed as an in…nite moving average process
Consider that only one element of the residual vector is shocked and that the e¤ects of the other shocks are integrated out using the distribution of residuals. More precisely, consider a shock to the j-th element of the residual vector, " jt , of size j . The generalized impulse response function of Y t is then given by
where E is the expectations operator and t 1 denotes available information at time t 1.
For a multivariate normal distribution of the residual vector, " t , and j = p jj it can be shown that the generalized impulse response reduces to ";n P e j p jj , n = 0; 1; :::,
where jj denotes the standard deviation of the j-th residual and e j is a selection vector whose elements are zero except for the j-th element which is equal to unity. This generalized impulse response measures the e¤ect of a one standard deviation shock to the j-th equation at time t on the expected values of Y t at time t + n. Table 3 : The table presents the Eurobarometer data sets used. We combine a selected set of 25 Eurobarometer surveys which include our main variable of interest "Trust in the European Central Bank". The surveys are conducted on a semi-annual basis and are obtained from the "GESISLeibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences'in Cologne, Germany.
